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SOFTWARE · MODELS · SILICON HARDWARE · HUMANITY 2026-11-02

07. Washington's Gatekeepers: Silicon Chips and Model Weights

Guarding the Physical Engines of Global Computing

Cross the Pacific to Washington, D.C., and you meet the older, hardware-first half of the global border architecture. Administered by the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) under the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR Parts 730-774), the US system governs global access to frontier computing hardware, chip-design software, and semiconductor manufacturing tools EAR734 EAR742 EAR774.

Every project touching the US system faces four sequential questions:

  1. Is it subject to the EAR? Part 734 covers items in the US, US-origin items abroad and specified foreign-made items, subject to stated exclusions and conditions. The published-information and fundamental-research provisions have qualifications, including special treatment for encryption. A foreign chip is not covered merely because some US software was involved. EAR734
  2. What is its ECCN (Part 774)? Controlled items carry codes on the Commerce Control List, notably 3A090 for advanced AI accelerators and 4E091 for certain closed frontier AI model weights EAR774.
  3. Where is it going (Part 742)? Licensing turns on destination country groups.
  4. Who is the end user, and what is the end use (Part 744)? Shipments to parties on the Entity List (744.11) or supporting restricted supercomputer, advanced-node semiconductor, or weapons end uses (744.23, 744.4) require licenses even when an item would otherwise be unrestricted EAR744.

The January 2026 Semiconductor Rule: Permission to Knock, Not an Open Door

For three years, high-end AI data-center chips bound for China faced presumptive denial. On 15 January 2026, BIS issued a targeted hardware calibration (91 FR 1684, revising 15 CFR 742.6(b)(10)): qualifying exports from the United States to end users in China or Macau may apply for case-by-case license review rather than automatic denial if the chip sits below Total Processing Performance (TPP) of 21,000 and total DRAM bandwidth of 6,500 GB/s, a performance window exemplified in the rule by Nvidia's H200 and AMD's MI325X US26 EAR742.

Yet read the conditions carefully: case-by-case review is permission to apply, not a free pass. Applicants must certify that US domestic customers face no supply shortage, that global foundry capacity is not diverted away from US buyers, that aggregate shipments stay within strict ratios of US volume, that rigorous physical and cybersecurity KYC controls block unauthorized remote or Entity-List use, and that an independent US-headquartered laboratory tests and verifies the chips' performance before export US26, sections I and IV. Third-country reexports do not automatically enjoy the same review lane.

Two Neighboring Washington Gates: Venture Dollars and Bulk Sensitive Data

Beside BIS stand two separate federal gatekeepers:

  • US Treasury Outbound Investment Security Program: Since 2 January 2025, US persons funding Chinese semiconductors, quantum tech, or certain AI systems face prohibition or mandatory notification; on 22 October 2026, Treasury opened public comments (through 7 December 2026) on proposed refinements to technical thresholds TREAS.
  • US Department of Justice Data Security Program: Restricts bulk cross-border transfers or access involving sensitive US personal data (genomic, biometric, health, financial, geolocation) and government-related data DOJ.

What This Means for the Two Teams

Country A and Country B in the game are fictional. US and Chinese controls have different scopes, institutions and positions in the computing supply chain. This chapter explains those differences; it does not assign either real country a score of 3, 5, 17 or 20.

The two teams' starting point is in The Fortress Trap: How Both Sides Can Lose.